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THE NEW POLISH CONSTITUTION
STEPHEN GOROVEt
The political analyst, as well as the policy-maker, is interested in
recent constitutional developments in Eastern Europe since they pro-
vide him with a unique opportunity for the evaluation of recent con-
ditions and trends in a part of the world hardly penetrable by the
Western eye.
On July 22, 1952, a new Polish constitution was promulgated. By
the adoption of this fundamental law a chapter of the post-war po-
litical, economic and social development of Poland came to an end and
the country, guided by "the historic experience" of the Soviet Union,
entered the path of a new phase leading toward the establishment
of a socialistic-communistic society.
The events which have led to this development are well-known in
Polish history. Yet the purposes of analysis and evaluation make it
imperative to put modern events in their historical trend-perspective
by briefly tracing the major phases of this constitutional evolution.
RETROSPECT
The end of the First World War witnessed the emergence of Poland
as a victorious country on the side of the Western allies and set the
stage for her internal development. The first clarification concerning
her post-war constitutional status took place on February 20, 1919,
when the Constituent Diet approved the basic law of the land.
Observed as a provisional constitution, the document of 1919 was
replaced two years later by a more permanent constitution. Based
on the principles of Western democratic government, the Constitution
of 1921 continued to operate as the fundamental charter throughout
the greater part of the inter-war period. It was not until 1935 that
an actual revision took place in the form of a new constitution super-
seding the old one.'
t Former Research Associate, Department of Foreign Area Studies, Yale Uni-
versity and The Graduate School of Georgetown University.
1. For a brief summary of pre-war constitutional developments see 2 PFASLES,
CoNSTiTuTION OF NATIOSs 813 et seq. (1950).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Second World War and its aftermath brought about sweeping
changes in the former pattern of power relations which, in turn,
basically affected the internal structure of the East European coun-
tries bordering on the Soviet Union.2 The increasing exercise of
effective control in the newly extended sphere of Soviet influence be-
came "the decisive element in determining the character of post-war
r~gimes"3 in Eastern Europe.
Following the German occupation in 1939 and the "liberation" of
Poland, the Russian inspired Lublin Manifesto of July 22, 19444-in
spite of the futile protests of the London Government-in-exile to base
the legality of the post-war r6gime on the Constitution of 1935-
denounced the Constitution of 1935 as an "illegal, Fascist Constitu-
tion" representing the totalitarian philosophy; at the same time it
set up the Polish Committee for National Liberation,5 and the Na-
tional Council of the Homeland, instructing them to act on the basis
of the Constitution of 1921.
In line with the foregoing developments and under the impact of
forceful political events and increasing Soviet influence, the Con-
stituent Assembly, on February 19, 1947, adopted what is known as
the "Little Constitution ' 6 incorporating most of the basic provisions
of the Constitution of 19217 with respect to the organization and
powers of the supreme organs of the Polish Republic. Although the
"Little Constitution" left no doubt as to its provisional character,8 it
was not until May, 1951, that a Constitutional Committee was set
up to prepare the draft of a new constitution.9 The final draft as it
emerged after the approval of the Politbureau of the Polish Workers
Party (Communist Party) was passed on to the Seym (Legislative
Assembly) and was accepted by the latter on July 22, 1952, the day
that is now called "Constitution Day." By adopting the new basic
document, Poland became the last East European satellite to produce
a full-fledged post-war constitution.
Any discussion of recent constitutional documents or trends in
Eastern Europe is futile and may become utterly misleading unless
it is realized at the outset that the legal and political concepts re-
ferred to in these documents cannot be taken as the prima fracie
2. See Black, Constitutional Trends in Eastern Europe, 1945-48, 11 RE. POL.
197-198 (1949).3. See SHARP, Nw CowsTrruTioxs Ix THE SGvr SPHESE 5 (1950).
4. For text of Lublin Manifesto see Ross, POIAND OLD AND NW 334 (1948).
5. This Committee, known as the "Lublin Committee," on December 31, 1944
became the Provisional Government of Poland in Lublin; later in Warsaw.
6. For English text see 2 PEASLEs, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 815.
7. See Articles 21, 22, 24, 40, 42-53, 56-63.
8. Art. 1 of the "Little Constitution" reads: "Until such time as the new
Constitution of the Republic of Poland is duly established this Constituent Diet
... hereby makes the following provisions....
9. See Art. 1 of the Act of May 26, 1952.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss3/1
NEW POLISH CONSTITUTION
equivalents of seemingly similar concepts developed in Western
democratic countries.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that an evaluation of con-
stitutional provisions, if based purely on doctrine, interesting and
useful as it may be, is bound to be limited in its scope and application.
In this respect it is well to remember that a mass of rules and regu-
lations, theory and doctrine, remain a dead letter separated from
life and reality unless they are implemented by the establishment of
appropriate institutions and conforming practices. This holds es-
pecially true in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe where po-
litical reality has further and further drifted away from the legal
framework upon which formal authority rests. Any inference, there-
fore, that may be drawn from a single document concerning the exer-
cise and distribution of political power must be tested against the
patterns of effective control and respective practices.
Differences between the constitutions of Western democracies and
communist-made constitutions are not confined to differences as to
where the supreme formal authority rests or should reside, or how
the executive and the judicial power should be exercised, or how the
economic structure of the state should be organized; the two types
of constitutions also embody fundamental differences as to their very
meaning and general objective.
Unlike their Western counterparts, the constitutional documents
of the East-European communist-dominated countries are not con-
sidered to be the supreme law of the land, and their interpretation and
application are not determined by an independent judiciary but are
left to the whims of governmental power to which they are always
subordinate. Under the communist system of government there is,
and there can be, no real constitutional limitation on governmental
power, since the constitution in its interpretation and application is
subject to governmental power. This is the very reason why under
a communist system of government we cannot speak of a limited or
restrained government or of constitutionalism in the sense that these
concepts are understood in the Western democracies.
Further, it must be remembered that the communist-made consti-
tutions are not intended to serve as guiding principles for a more
or less distant future; they are rather looked upon as ephemeral
phenomena which-so the communists claim-reflect prevailing con-
ditions and which are designed to be replaced by new documents at
the next major step on the country's journey toward a socialistic-
communistic society.
Finally, it is well to keep in mind that in communist-dominated
countries the actual decision-making takes place within the inner-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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most circle of the Communist Party, an organization which is largely
of an extra-constitutional nature.10
PREAMBLE
A glance at the new Polish Constitution reveals that it hardly con-
tains any reminiscences of pre-war political tradition. Especially
conspicuous is the strict adherence to the Soviet Constitution of 1936
from which have been copied, with little or no alteration, not only
the most important provisions but also the general titles of chapters.
The Charter consists of a Preamble and Detailed Provisions.
In putting the Constitution in historical perspective, the Preamble
pays tribute to the Soviet Union which "liberated Polish soil" and
"made possible the rebirth of Poland."1 It is unique, if not unprece-
dented, that the constitution of an 'independent' state should openly
acknowledge that its 'independence' was achieved by the "historic
victory" of another state, and should admit that its working class,
"the leading class in the community," is supported by the Communist
International and by the "historic experience" of another State.12
This constitutional reference to the Soviet Union's role in supporting
the establishment and internal structure of Poland is for all intents
and purposes a clear-cut official acknowledgment of her satellite
status.23
The Preamble also includes a brief enumeration of general objec-
tives which are primarily designed to serve propaganda purposes
both for actual domestic and potential foreign consumption. As one
of its express purposes, the Constitution strives "to eliminate com-
pletely the exploitation of man by man" and "to put into effect the
great ideals of Socialism." 114 These two declarations clearly indicate
that the so-called "exploitation of man by man" has not yet been
abolished and that in Poland, unlike in the Soviet Union,15 'full
socialism' has not yet been achieved.
Another indication of the drafters' consciousness of the differences
which exist between their country and the Soviet Union is the fact
that Poland is designated in the Preamble as a "People's Republic,"
10. The Constitution of the Soviet Union is, of course, an exception.
11. See Preamble to the Constitution.
12. Ibid.
13. A similar and even more explicit statement can be found in the new
Roumanian Constitution of July 18, 1952, which amended the former Constitu-
tion adopted in 1948. The new Constitution includes a provision that the foreign
policy of Roumania is one of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union.
Thus Roumania, in an even more conspicuous fashion, has given u an important
part of her sovereignty by limiting her freedom of action in the feld of foreign
relations.
14. Preamble to the Constitution.
15. See TOWsTER, POTIOCAL Pow=a IN THE USSR, 1917-1947 12 (1949).
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i.e., a state of "People's Democracy,"'16 and not as a "Socialist Re-
public."
Finally, the Preamble is the clue to the interpretation of the
people's democratic system. The concept of "People's Democracy"
denotes a State where "as a result of the revolutionary struggles and
transformations, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been
overthrown" and "a new social system" is "taking shape and growing
in strength."'7 It also signifies a State in which "the foundation of
the people's authority is the alliance between the working class"
(proletariat) and "the working peasants," and where "the leading
role belongs to the working class," the class supported by "the inter-
national working class movement" and by "the historic experience"
of the Soviet Union.,
DETAILED PROVISIONS
The detailed provisions of the Constitution are subdivided under
ten headings which include, inter alix, the political and economic
structure of the State, the supreme organs of State authority and
of State administration, the local organs of the State, the judiciary
and the rights and duties of citizens.
Political Structure
In Article 1 of the Constitution, the Polish People's Republic is pro-
claimed to be a State of people's democracy where "the power be-
longs to the working people of town and country."'19 This provision
represents a noteworthy departure from some of the earlier satellite
constitutions;" which were satisfied with a general declaration that
all power in the State emanates from and belongs to the people, that
is, to the citizenry at large. Under the new Polish Constitution this
is no longer the case, since the power is entrusted only and exclu-
16. Art. 1 of the new POLISH CONSTITUTION. (Hereafter, the new Constitution
will not be referred to specifically by name, but by article alone).
17. Preamble to the Constitution.
18. A concise definition of a people's democracy is given by Neumann:
It is a State in which the classless society has not yet been achieved but
in which the communist party has the upper hand and has begun the
task of liquidating its opponents. It is also a State that follows the lead
of the Soviet Union.
See Neumann, Constitutional Documents of East-Central Europe, 12 J. OF POL.
62 (1950). Compare Guins, Constitutions of the Soviet Satellites, 271 ANNALS 64(1950) ("People's democracies represent a transitional form and are supposed
to move from the 'bourgeois democracy' toward the 'highest' or 'perfect' type
of democracy of the Soviet pattern."); Yakobson, The Soviet Concept of Satellite
States, 11 REV. POL. 191 (19502) ("People's democracy is the forerunner to a
socialist society."). See also, SHARP, Naw CONSTITUTIONS IN THE Sovlur SPHERE
17 (1950) (A people's democracy is "the dictatorship of the proletariat differing
in form but not in essence from the Soviet model."). Compare Black, Constitu-
tional Trends in Eastern Europe, 11 Rnv. POr,. 199 (1949).
19. For a similar provision see Art. 3 of the Hungarian Constitution of 1949.
20. E.g., in Art. 1, § 2 of the Czechoslovakian Constitution of 1948 the
people as a whole were described as "the sole source of all power in the State."
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sively to the 'working' people and rests upon "the alliance between the
working class and the working peasants."21 At the same time, the
Preamble leaves no doubt that the lion's share in the wielding of this
power, "the leading role '22 in this alliance, belongs to the working
class, and, in practice, we may add, it belongs to the 'vanguard' of the
working class, the Communist Party.
The framers of the new Constitution seem to have been fully aware
of the dangers of the existence of any type of opposition to the com-
plete dictatorship of the proletariat. Accordingly, the Constitution
considers that one of the primary tasks of the State is to safeguard
and protect the power of the working people against hostile forces.22
For the very same reason the State also "limits, ousts and abolishes




The incorporation of provisions in the Constitution concerning the
basic economic order provides the formal legal framework for in-
creasing state activity in the economic field.
The economic structure of the people's democracies is characterized
by the gradual elimination of the remnants of the former private
enterprise system and by the introduction of a State directed, con-
trolled and planned economy. In following this general pattern the
new Polish Constitution postulates that the State establishes "planned
economy" founded on enterprises constituting social property.- Thus
the development of the economic life of the country takes place in
accordance with a "National Economic Plan," the execution of which
is assured, in particular, by "the expansion of Socialist State in-
dustry."26
The economic plan is not exclusively directed toward the achieve-
ment of economic goals such as "the development of the productive
forces of the country" or the "continuous raising of the standard of
living of the working masses," but at the same time, it is admittedly
aimed at the "consolidation of power" of the present regime and
at the building up of the "defense strength" of the country.2 7
The supervision and direction of all economic activity by the State
reaches its all-time high in the field of foreign trade where the State
21. See Preamble to the Constitution. Single quotation marks as used in
this article signify phrases frequently used by the Communist.
22. "Leading role" would seem to mean a somewhat milder equivalent to
complete dictatorship.
23. Art 3, § L
24. Art. 3, § 4.
25. Art. 3, § 3.
26. Art. 7, § 1.
27. Art. 7, § 3.
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enjoys absolute "monopoly" with the complete exclusion of private
enterprise and initiative.28
As to the means of production, communist doctrine teaches that
they are in the possession of the people as a whole and are owned by
the State. While the Polish Constitution seems to depart from this
basic philosophy by allowing cooperative organizations and private
individuals to have means of production in their possession, a closer
examination of the constitutional provisions reveals that the most
important means of production are part and parcel of the national
wealth. Items in this category include mineral deposits, waters, State
forests, mines, roads, rail, water and air transport and other means
of communication, banks, State industrial establishments, State farms
and State machine stations, State commercial enterprises and
utilities.'"
We may notice that land, in general, apart from minerals, State
farms and so on, is not listed among the items belonging to the State.
The reason for this is to be found in the cautious communist tactics
toward collectivization which take full account of the Russian experi-
ence and of the "incredible tenacity" with which the Polish peasant
holds on to his land.," In line with these considerations the Consti-
tution, in principle, protects the individual farms of the working
peasants "against capitalist exploitation," 31 but, at the same time, it
leaves the door open for collectivization by giving "special support
and all-round aid to the co-operative farms set up on the principle
of voluntary membership, as forms of collective economy. ' 32 Consider
ing that "the development of different forms of the co-operative move-
ment in town and country"33 is one of the primary tasks of the State,
there can be little doubt that the present situation is viewed as a
transitional phase which will eventually lead to the defeat of the
peasants' resistance and to the complete abolition of individual farms.
The general trend toward nationalization and collectivization is also
clear from the meagre protection accorded by the Constitution to
'individual' property. The Constitution recognizes individual property
and the right to inherit land, buildings and other means of produc-
tion, 3 yet it does this with three important restrictions. In the first
place, the protection is granted only within the framework of "exist-
ing legislation,"35 which, in effect, leaves the extent of individual
28. Art. 7, § 2.
29. Art. 8.
30. See Ulam, The Crisis in the Polish Communist Party, 12 REv. POL. 83, 94
(1950).
31. Art. 10, § 1.
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property rights to be determined by legislation or simple government
decrees. In the second place, the text of Article 12 seems to suggest
that the protection extends only to individual property, and the in-
heritance of land, buildings and other means of production of
peasants, craftsmen and persons engaged in domestic ,handicraft
industries36 In other words, all other individuals not belonging to
the listed occupations are excluded from protection under this Article.
In the third place, the Constitution permits the confiscation of prop-
erty "in cases determined by law, by virtue of a final judgment" by
the Court27
After a thorough scrutiny of the economic provisions of the Con-
stitution it would seem that the economic structure of the Polish
People's Republic has already passed the stage that characterized
the Soviet Union during the era of the New Economic Policy where
the shrinking remnants of capitalism still existed but "the command-
ing heights remained in the hands of the proletarian State."33
In view of the fact that unqualified constitutional protection has
shrunk to the narrow circle of "personal" property" and taking into
account the full implications of a State planned, directed and con-
trolled economy with its concomitants--the constitutional duty to
work o and its necessary counterpart, the abolition of freedom to
strike and of labor contract-it is not difficult to see that the new
Constitution makes giant strides to follow the pattern set by the
Soviet Union hastening "the full realization of the Socialist system. 41
Supreme Organs of State Authority
Following closely the Soviet pattern, the new Constitution rejects
the doctrine of the separation of powers and declares that the Seym
is "the highest representative of the will of the working people.11"-
Endowed with powers to pass laws and to exercise control over the
State machinery, the Seym is claimed to be "[t] he highest organ of
State authority.' 3 Thus, theoretically, the Seym-composed of the
representatives of the people and elected by the citizens in constitu-
encies4k--would seem to be the supreme embodiment of national
36. The full text of Art. 12 reads:
The Polish People's Republic recognizes and protects, on the basis of
the existing legislation, individual property and the right to inherit land,
buildings and other means of production of peasants, craftsmen and per-
sons engaged in home handicraft industries.
37. Art. 74, § 3.
38. Stalin's address before the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, cited
in VISHINsKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 102 (1948).
39. Art. 13.
40. Art. 14, § 1.
41. Ibid.
42. Art. 15, § 2.
43. Art. 15, § 1.
44. Arts. 2 and 16.
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sovereignty. A further examination, however, of the Constitutional
document reveals that the 'Seym supremacy' thus proclaimed hardly
takes account of the actual distribution of formal authority among
the highest organs of State. The constitutional reality is that the
Council of State4'--an organ which has its counterpart in the Praesi-
dium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR46-enjoys a unique, if not a
paramount position, with respect to all other organs of State, includ-
ing the Seym itself. Its constitutional powers include the most im-
portant functions such as the ordering of elections to the Seym, the
exercise of the right to propose legislation,'" the appointing and re-
ceiving of diplomatic representatives, the ratification and denuncia-
tion of international treaties, the appointment of the highest officers
of State, and the right to pardon.48
Moreover, the Council of State exercises ultimate supervision over
the local People's Councils, the organs of State administration in the
various localities, 49 and it elects the judges of the Supreme Court for
a period of 5 years.9, It appoints and can dismiss the General Public
Prosecutor who is accountable for activities of his office to the Coun-
cil.5" It may introduce martial law in either the whole or part of the
Republic, should this be required by considerations of the defense or
security of the State. For the same reason it may proclaim partial or
general mobilization. 52
In addition, the Council of State has three functions of outstanding
importance which even more emphatically indicate that the consti-
tutional distribution of power fails to correspond to the principle of
'Seym supremacy.'
In the first place, the Council of State is empowered to interpret
the laws and its interpretation is "universally binding" on the entire
community. 53 The courts are no longer free to interpret the laws
independently but are bound to follow the official interpretation.
Moreover, since the right to universally binding interpretation im-
plies the power to annul or alter administrative orders and decisions
of the government which, in the interpretation of the Council of State,
do not conform to the constitution or the laws (decrees) of the land,
45. The institution of the President of the Republic has been abolished; in-
stead a Council of State has been set up, consisting of a President, two Deputy
Presidents, a Secretary and of eleven members. See Art. 24, § 1 of the new Con-
stitution.
46. See VISHINSKY, THE LAW or THE Soviur STATE 102 (1948).
47. This right is shared with the Government and the Deputies; see Art. 20,§ 1.
48. Art. 25, §§ 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11.
49. Art. 27.
50. Art. 50, § 2.
51. Art. 55, §§ 1, 3.
52. Art. 28, § 2.
53. Art. 25, § 1(4).
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it is not difficult to see that through the interpretative function the
Council assumes an all-important constitutional duty.
In the second place, during the Seym recesses, which are fre-
quent,51 the Council of State wields all the powers of the Seym, in-
cluding the power of legislation (issuing of decrees with the force
of law) ,5 suspension of deputies, immunity from arrest," declaration
of war,5 7 and appointment and recall of members of the Council of
Ministers."8
Finally, the Council of State is given exclusive authority to convoke
sessions of the Seym.5 Although the Constitution specifies the in-
stances in which the Council is bound to convoke a session,60 never-
theless, there is no constitutional safeguard in case the Council of
State does not comply with the provision. In other words, the Seym
is in no position to call itself into sessions but is, in this respect,
entirely dependent on the Council of State.
The foregoing review of the distribution of formal power among
the supreme organs of state authority in the constitutional document
seems to indicate that the Council of State is the central constitu-
tional organ of State authority. While it is true that theoretically
the Council of State is elected by"l and accountable to the Seym for
all its activities,°2 and submits its decrees,3 and decisions"' at the
next session of the Seym for approval, 5 it is hard to see how this
formal accountability to the Seym could outweigh the paramount
constitutional power position of the Council of State. A final argu-
ment against the principle of 'Seym supremacy' lies in the fact that
the members of the Council of State, unlike the individual represen-
tatives of the Seym 6 and the other organs of State, are not subject
to recall.
54. The Constitution envisages only two regular sessions yearly (Art. 17, §
1). The tenure of a session, however, is not prescribed, so that theoretically
after convocation the session may be closed immediately.
55. Art. 25, § 1(5).
56. Art. 16, § 3.
57. Art. 28, § 1.
58. Art. 29, § 2.
59. Art. 25, § 2.
60. In addition to the two yearly sessions, the Council of State is bound to
convoke a session on a written motion by one-third of the total number of de-
puties, and likewise within a period of one month from the date of the elections.
ee Art. 17.
61. Art. 24, § 1.
62. Art. 25, § 1(2).
63. Art. 26, § 1.
64. Art. 29, § 2.
65. Constitutional practice in Poland shows that the approval by the Seym
is invariably and unanimously given. See Ayars, The Sovietization of Poland&
Judiciy System, 173 CAT. Wouw 22 (April 1951).
66. Art. 2, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the "people's representatives
in the Seym" are "responsible to their constituents and may be recalled by them."
It may be noted that the possibility of recalling the representatives from
the Seym serves as a sort of security-vent by which unwanted representatives
can easily be replaced by new ones who are sufficiently subservient to the regime.
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Supreme Orgam of State Administration
Under the new Constitution, the Government is the highest execu-
tive and administrative organ.61 It is composed of the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers as its Head, the Vice-Chairman and the
ministers, who together form the Council of Ministers., The Council
of Ministers or its individual members are appointed and can be re-
called at any time by the Seym or, in the intervals between the sessions
of the Seym, by the Council of State, to which they are accountable.2'
While the Constitution speaks of the Government explicitly as an
executive and administrative body whose regulations and decisions
are issued in pursuance of existing laws, 70 and while most of the
constitutional functions of the Government seem to fall within the
orbit of essentially executive jurisdiction,71 the third paragraph of
Article 32 endows the Government with substantial quasi-legislative
powers by providing for the adoption, by the Government, of the
yearly economic plan. Whereas the long-term economic plan must
be submitted for formal approval to the Seym,7 2 there is no such
obligation with respect to the yearly plans, the determination and
adoption of which is left entirely to the discretion of the Government.
In the above cited article there is a tacit constitutional acknowledg-
ment of the fact that the Government has drifted away from its
purely administrative-executive character and has increasingly as-
sumed legislative functions. In practice, the general trend toward
governmental legislation is also apparent from the increasing number
of laws passed by the Seym which hardly contain more than a bare
frame of general authorization leaving the respective provisions con-
cerning the subject matter to be filled in by Government decrees or
ministerial orders.7 ,
The Constitution describes the People's Councils as the organs of
State authority in rural localities, in towns, in boroughs of larger
towns, in poviats (districts) and voivodships.7- They are elected by
the "population"" for a term of three years- and they elect their
67. Art. 30, § 1. "Government" is defined by this Article as the Council of
Ministers.
68. Art. 31.
69. Arts. 29 and 30, § 2.
70. Art. 32, § 7.
71. The executive and administrative functions of the Government include
the co-ordination, direction and supervision of the activities of Ministries, the
surveillance of the execution of laws, the supervision of the execution of the
budget and of the National Economic Plan, the protection of public order, the
general guidance in the field of foreign relations and in defense matters, and
the direction of the work of the Praesidia of the People's Councils. See Art.
32,§§ 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,10 and Art. 33, § 3.
7 Art. 32, § 2.
73. Arts. 32, § 7 and 33, § 2.
74. Art. 34, § 1.
75. Art. 34, § 2.
76. Ibid,
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own Praesidia which act as their executive and administrative
organs.77
The People's Councils are designed to represent the "will of the
working people"78 (not of the citizenry at large), and we may add
that in communist practice this means the will of the working people
as expressed by its advance guard, the Communist Party.
The over-all objective of the People's Councils is described in lofty
phrases. It includes the development of "creative initiative and
activity in order to multiply the strength, prosperity and culture of
the nation."19 The People's Councils also strengthen the links between
the State authority and the working people "by drawing ever broader
masses of the working people into participation in governing the
State.,'8o
Within the foregoing general spheres, the more specific task of
the People's Councils extends to the direction of economic, social and
cultural activities in the respective locality, the maintenance of public
order and of the people's rule of law, the protection of social property,
the safeguarding of civil rights, cooperation in building the defense
strength of the State, and the adoption of local economic plans
and budget.81
The well-known communist doctrine of democratic centralism also
applies in relation to the People's Councils. The People's Councils of
a higher level may rescind the decision of the People's Council of a
lower level or of its Praesidium, if the decision is in conflict with
the law or incompatible with the basic line of the policy of the State. 2
The Praesidium, the executive organ of the People's Council, may also
exercise this right and submit the case for decision at the next
meeting of its own People's Council.83 These provisions ensure, in
accordance with the basic policy of State, i.e., the Party line, the
uniformity and the most centralized control from the lowest People's
Council up to the Council of State which exercises the ultimate super-
vision over the People's Councils.'
The preceding survey of constitutional provisions indicates the
patterns of distribution of power on the formal level between the
organs of State authority and State administration. Although the
Constitution, unlike its counterpart in Soviet Russia,85 makes no men-
tion of the Communist Party,0 it would be a mistake to overlook two




81. Arts. 37, 39 and 41.
82. Art. 44, § 1.83. Art. 44 § 2.
84. Art. 27.85. See Art. 126 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936.86. Among the satellite Constitutions, the Hungarian Constitution of 1949 is
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specific references which dispel any doubt that one may entertain as
to the political underpinnings of the various organs of State. For
one thing, the Constitution enunciates that the right of nominating
candidates for the Seym and the People's Councils is delegated to the
"political and social organizations uniting citizens in towns and in
the country." 7 For another, it makes no secret of the fact that "the
setting up of and participation in associations whose aims or activi-
ties are directed against the political and social structure or against
the legal order of the Polish People's Republic"--a structure and an
order characterized by the leading role of the proletariat 8 and its
vanguard, the Communist Party-is forbidden. Thus it is obvious
that the Constitution allows no room for political opposition and that
all candidates to the Seym and to the organs elected by the Seym 9
and to the People's Councils must have the official endorsement of
the advance guard of the proletariat, the Communist Party.
Extra-constitutional as it is, the Communist Party through its
auxiliary organizations and transmission belts permeates every sphere
of political, social and economic activity. It is the ultimate source
of effective control over all organs of State. It is the clue to the
understanding of the whole decision-making process; it is the driving,
directing and controlling force in all major manifestations of human
relationships.
The Judiciary
The exercise of the judicial power of the Polish People's Republic
revolves around two distinct branches: the Courts; and the Office of
the Public Prosecutor, an investigating and prosecuting agency.
The administration of justice is vested in the Courts, consisting of
the Supreme Court, Voivodship and District courts, as well as special
courts in extraordinary circumstances.", While the Supreme Court
is the highest judicial organ,", the investigation and prosecution
branch is headed by the General Public Prosecutor.92
In order to grasp the basic differences between Western democratic
and communist judicial systems, it is extremely instructive to look at
the constitutionally assigned functions of the courts. First of all, the
courts are the custodians of the "structure of the Polish People's
Republic." This structure, as it has already been pointed out, is based
on the leading role of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist
the only one to hint at the "advance guard" of the working class; see Art. 56 of
the Hungarian Constitution.
87. Art. 86.
88. Preamble to the Polish Constitution.
89. Council of State, Council of Ministers.
90. Art. 46, §§ 1, 2.
91. Art. 51, § 1.
92. Arts. 54, § 2 and 56.
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Party. Since communist doctrine rejects the principle of the separa-
tion of powers and the concept of judicial review, it follows that the
task of the courts is not to uphold the Constitution but to safeguard
"the achievements of the working people,"0' 3 a task which is tanta-
mount to protection from and punishment of the regime's political
opponents.9' In the second place, the courts and the prosecutor do
not safeguard the rule of law in general but only the "people's rule
of law." 1 This point may seem insignificant. In communist practice,
however, it is tantamount to the fact that in applying the rules of
law in a particular instance the judge (prosecutor) has to decide
whether the application of a particular rule of law (prosecution of
the crime) is in the interest of the working class as interpreted by
its advance guard, the Communist Party. In other words, there is
no positive legal rule that would have to be followed in all circum-
stances.
Another significant feature of the new Polish judiciary is revealed
by the inclusion of lay or people's judges on the benches of the courts
who, as a rule, participate in the hearing of cases and the pronounce-
ment of judgments.16 Under communist practice the old judges and
lawyers are gradually eliminated. They are replaced by activists,
that is, party members trained for specific purposes who go to the
trials with prepared party instructions and a prepared verdict which
they enforce in the court. 7 .
Still another characteristic of the Polish judicial system is that
judges not only have no right to pass on the constitutionality of laws
(complete absence of judicial review),98 but have no power to declare
ultra vires the orders issued by the Government or by the individual
ministers.
In addition, the courts are deprived of one of the most important
judicial functions, i.e., the interpretation of the laws. As it has
already been indicated the interpretative function is exclusively en-
trusted to the Council of State.", Since it is the interpretation of the
93. Art. 48.
94. See Art. 41, § 1, of the Hungarian Constitution of 1946, Published in 1949:
The courts of the Hungarian People's Republic punish the enemies of
the working people, protect and safeguard the State, the social and eco-
nomic order and the institutions of the people's democracy and the rights of
the workers and educate the working people in the observance of the rules
governing the life of a socialist commonwealth.
95. Arts. 48 and 54, § 1.
96. Arxt. 49.
97. See Ayars, The Sovietization of Poland's Judiciary Sy1stem, 173 CATH.
WORM 22 (April 1951).
98. This was already expressly forbidden by the "Little Constitution." See
Art. 24, § 3, of the 1947 Polish Constitution.
99. Art. 25, § 1(4).
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laws that determines their application,100 material justice becomes
completely dependent on the whims of the Council of State.
If we also keep in mind that the justices of the Supreme Court are
elected by the Council of State10 ' and the General Public Prosecutor
is also appointed and recalled by the Council of State, and if we take
into consideration the extensive and arbitrary administrative control
over the bench and the prosecuting agencies, it is difficult to see in
just what sense the independence of judges so eloquently affirmed by
the Constitution'12 could have any real meaning or justification, ex-
cept in the sense of serving propaganda purposes.
The core of the new judicial system centers around the role of the
Public Prosecutor, faithful servant of the communist cause. He safe-
guards "the people's rule of law" (social legality), "watches over the
protection of social property and ensures that the rights of the citi-
zens be respected.' ' °1 In particular, he is entrusted with the super-
vision of the prosecution of offenses endangering the system, security
and independence of the State.'0 4
The recognition of the increasingly important role of the public
prosecutor in the administration of justice is also evident from the
fact that he enjoys extensive powers that were previously granted
only to independent judges. Thus, under the new Constitution, the
public prosecutor has equal rights with the judge in detaining a
person.,.1
The foregoing provisions of the Constitution clearly indicate that
under a communist regime justice, like the political police or the
people's army, is only regarded as a tool of th dictatorship. The
main objective of the administration of justice is not impartiality,
legality, or justice, but the defense of the power of the Communist
Party and the liquidation and punishment of its political opponents.
Rights and Duties of Citizens
For the superficial observer some of the constitutional provisions
'guaranteeing' civil rights and liberties would seem to be reminis-
100. See Gorove, Hungary: International Aspects of the New Penal Code,
3 AM. J. COMP. L. 82, 87 (1954).
101. Formerly the justices to the Supreme Court were appointed for life;
under the new Constitution they are elected for a term of five years. See Art.
50, § 2.
102. Art. 52.
103. Art. 54, § 1. The "Little Constitution" contained no provisions concern-
ing the organization and functions of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Up to
1950 the Public Prosecutor's Office was attached to the courts fulfilling pri-
marily the functions of a State organ for the prosecution of crimes. On July 15,
1950 a law was passed transforming the former Office of Public Prosecutor from
an organ to fight crimes into an organ to watch over the pursuit of social
legality.
104. Art. 54, § 2.105. Art. 714, § 1.
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cent of the Bills of Rights generally developed in Western demo-
cratic countries. At least this is the impression one may get after
glancing at the long list of fundamental rights of the citizens. 0
What is the constitutional reality and communist practice behind the
high-sounding 'guarantees' of civil liberties?
One of the most significant achievements claimed by the com-
munist propaganda is the right to work.10° According to Article 58,
Section 2, this right is assured
.. . by the social ownership of the basic means of production; the
development of a social and co-operative system in the country-
side, free from exploitation; by the planned growth of productive
forces; by the elimination of the sources of economic crises; and
by the abolition of unemployment.
In order to dispel any doubts about the meaning and scope of this
right, it is appropriate to emphasize that under no circumstances is
the individual left free to decide whether he wants to work or not.
Under the Constitution he has no such right. On the contrary, there
is an explicit constitutional obligation, the duty to work. 0 8 What the
Constitution means by the right to work is the "right to employment
paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of work done."'""
But neither the location, nor the amount, nor the kind of work is left
to be determined by the individual, worker. These will be decided by
the communist-controlled employment agencies and trade unions.
Although the Constitution guarantees in lofty phrases "the right
to rest and leisure," and "to health protection," it gives an inkling of
the truth by specificalIy mentioning the "manual and professional
workers" and the "masses of the working people" as beneficiaries of
holiday, insurance and other schemes." 0
Another constitutionally 'guaranteed' right is the right to educa-
tion. From the respective constitutional provisions it would seem
that this 'right' stands much nearer to the concept of a constitutional
duty than to that of a privilege. Thus the Constitution speaks of a
"compulsory," basic education,"' a principle which in practice leaves
little or no choice for the individual to determine the kind of educa-
tion or the type of school he may prefer. On the contrary, since
Article 70 of the Constitution only allows the churches and other
religious bodies to exercise their "religious" functions, it is apparent
that the whole educational system is dominated by the State and, in
106. The "Little Constitution" contained no Bill of Rights. The civil rights
and liberties were embodied in a separate Declaration. For a text of the Dec,
laration (Feb. 27, 1947), see ROSE, POLAND OLD AND NEw 340 (1948).
107. Art. 58, 1.
108. Art. 14, § 1.
109. Art. 58, § 1.
110. Arts. 59 and 60.
111. Art. 61, § 2(1).
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practice, it is placed under strong Party control."12 The Constitution
makes no secret of the fact that it stands on the basis of early com-
munist indoctrination. Accordingly, it provides that the State "pays
especially careful attention to the education of youth."" 3
Another striking feature of the educational system is that, although
the State provides for the "constant development of secondary
schools" and "of schools of university level, 11 14 in practice, it makes
it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the descendants of the
middle class to enter institutions of higher learning. In fact, the
Constitution itself hints at the truth by admitting that "scholarships,
development of hostels, boarding schools and students' hostels as
well as other forms of material aid" are only open for the children of
the workers and not to those of the citizenry at large.115
Under the pretext of guaranteeing "the right to benefit from cul-
tural achievements,""" the Constitution places art, science and culture
under strict State control. By Articles 62 and 63 the State has the
exclusive right to foster "the all-round development of science" and
to take care of "the development of Arts and Letters." Although, in
principle, the right to benefit from cultural achievements is guaran-
teed to every citizen, in its application it is constitutionally limited
to the "popular masses" and "to the working people of town and
country."117
The Constitution further enunciates the equality of women with
men in all fields of public, political, economic, social and cultural life
under the mottos of "equal rights with men to work and pay" and
"equal pay for equal work."" This provision in a way served to
mitigate the reaction against the latest labor legislation designed to
draw more women into the cadres of heavy manual laborers.
In line with the new Soviet policy towards marriage and divorce,
the Polish Constitution declares the marriage and family to be under
the protection of the State. 19 The reason for this must be sought in
the recognition by the communists of the fact that stable family
relations are conducive to the focusing of interest and attention on
public duties and activities."0
Under the Constitution no discrimination is permitted among citi-
zens on account of nationality, race or religion, and the "spreading
of hatred or contempt, the provocation of disputes or the humiliation
112. See Art. 121 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936.
113. Art. 68.
114. Art. 61, § 2(2).
115. Art. 61, § 2(4).
116. Art. 62, § 1.
117. Art. 62, §§ 1, 2.
118. Art. 66, §§ 1, 2(1).
119. Art. 67.
120. See Gurian. From Lenin to Stalin, 12 R. Po.. 379, 385 (1950).
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of man on account of national, racial or religious differences are
forbidden."1 21 It is all too obvious from this provision that discrimi-
nation and spreading of hatred on account of other reasons, e.g.,
political creed or opinion is permitted, and in practice, it is even en-
couraged.
The Constitution also reveals that the former safeguards of inde-
pendent churches and the free exercise of religious instruction have
been abolished completely. 22 Consequently there is no longer any
constitutional limitation on the nationalization or confiscation of
Church property, denominational schools and charitable institutions.
Moreover, by the very fact that it fails to guarantee the free exercise
of religious instruction, the new Constitution not only does away
with compulsory religious education but goes even further than the
notorious Agreement of April 14, 1950, by which the Government at
least guaranteed to permit religious instruction in schools. In the
new Constitution there is no such guarantee. 12 3
The Constitution also proclaims the separation of the Church from
the State.1 The relationship, however, between the Church and the
State is no longer determined on the basis of mutual consent but
unilaterally and exclusively by the State. The former principles and
laws concerning the Church and State relationship may now be altered
unilaterally, by a simple decree of the Council of State, if the Seym
is not in Session, and the Church may entirely be disregarded. Ac-
cordingly, the Constitution postulates that the basis of the relations
between Church and State, as well as the legal position of the con-
fessional communities and their property, are determined by law.212
Freedom of conscience and religion, in principle, are 'guaranteed'
by the Constitution.2r Although under Article 70 the Church and
other religious bodies may freely exercise their "religious" functions,
and, although it is forbidden to prevent citizens by coercion from
taking part in religious activities or rites, the third paragraph of the
very same article reveals that the scope of this freedom is extremely
limited and suggests that the extent of its enforcement is entirely
determined by political exigency. Thus, the latter clause provides for
the punishment of those who, by exercising (abusing) their religious
freedoms, endanger "the interests of the Polish People's Republic."
In practice, the question whether the exercise of religious freedoms
in a given situation does or does not endanger the interests of the
Polish People's Republic is determined by the Party line.
121. Art. 69, §§ 1, 2.
122. See Arts. 70 and 113 of the Polish Constitution of 1935.
123. Under the new Constitution parents or priests who compel children to
learn their religion or to go to church may be punished. See Art. 70, § 1.
124. Art. 70, § 2.
125. Ibid.
126. Art 70, §1.
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Similarly, the following Article2"7 raises serious doubts as to the
general scope of application of the freedoms of speech, of press, of
meetings and assemblies, and of processions and demonstrations. It
says that the "granting to the working people and their organizations
of the use of printing shops, stocks of papers, public buildings and
halls, means of communication, radio and other indispensable material
means," serves to put these freedoms into effect. This provision,
then, very explicitly limits the application of the respective freedoms
"to the working people and their organizations.' 1 28 In other words
only the 'working people can exercise these rights and only in con-
junction with their organizations and not separately. For this reason,
in communist countries, individual workers, not united in organi-
zations or not acting in conjunction with their organizations, cannot
obtain printing supplies or start publishing a paper in which their
views will be expressed.2 For the same reason, they cannot use
radio facilities and other means of communication. They cannot or-
ganize public meetings, processions or demonstrations except in co-
operation with their organizations. On the other hand, the "right to
unite in public organizations" is strictly limited to associations whose
aims and activities are not directed "against the political and social
structure or against the legal order" of the State,1" 0 a structure and
order characterized by the leading role of the proletariat and its
vanguard, the Communist Party. 31
The constitutional picture may further be supplemented by the well-
known fact that the merger of the Workers' Party with the Polish
Socialist Party in the communist controlled United Workers' Party
eliminated the last potential focus of political opposition to the con-
solidation of communist dictatorship in Poland. 3 2
While the Constitution enunciates the principles of individual
liberty and of inviolability of the home,13' in both instances it provides
for escape clauses by allowing the scope and extent of these rights to
be determined by legislation or executive decrees having the force
of law. Moreover, the fact that not only the judge but the public
prosecutor as well is constitutionally authorized to issue warrants
of arrests, clearly reveals the true nature of the 'habeas corpus.'
Finally, the Constitution 'guarantees' the right to vote "irrespective
of sex, nationality and race, religion, education, length of residence,
127. Art. 71, § 2.
128. Italics added.
129. Freedom of press is interpreted not as freedom from State interference
but as independence from capital or, more exactly, the "transfer of the instru-
ments of printing from capital to labor as represented by its vanguard." See
Timasheff, The sovieat Concept of Democracy, 12 RIV. PoL. 506. 513 (1950).
130. Art. 72, § 3.
131. See Preamble to the Constitution.
132. See Ulam, The Crisis in the Polish Communist Party, 12 REV. PoL. 83.
99 (1950).
133. Art. 74, §§ 1, 2.
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social origin, profession and property status. 3 4 This enumeration
in itself provides a conclusive proof of the fact that the right is not
guaranteed irrespective of political belief and opinion. Under this
clause the communist controlled election committees may disqualify
voters whose political reliability or devotion to the communist cause
is under the slightest suspicion.
The foregoing review of the fundamental rights and liberties in-
dicates that the high-sounding rights to work, to health, to education
and so on, hardly offer more than a series of principles which the
constitutional provisions themselves repudiate.
Many articles enunciating fundamental rights are followed either
by direct restrictions contained in subsequent provisions or by in-
direct limitations contained in clauses empowering the Seym or the
Council of State to determine or restrict the scope of these freedoms
by law or by decrees having the force of law.
How can we talk about freedom of speech, of press and of asso-
ciation, and the right to unite in public organization if these rights
are denied to any kind of political opposition against the government
in power? How can we talk about the enforcement of any of these
rights if the simplest guarantees of a truly independent judiciary are
lacking and if the most elementary judicial function, the interpreta-
tion of laws, is left exclusively to the vagaries of the Council of State?
Some of these rights and liberties, indeed, reveal their truly propa-
gandistic character. By Article 75 asylum is granted to citizens of
foreign countries who are being persecuted "for defending the in-
terests of the working masses, for struggling for social progress, for
activity in the defence of peace, for fighting for national liberation,
or for scientific activity." This provision seems to give constitutional
approval of and support to the world revolutionary aims of Soviet
imperialism.
The thorough student, however, will discover no provisions in the
Constitution guaranteeing some traditional civil rights common in
Western democratic countries. Throughout the Constitution there is
no reference whatsoever to the freedom to choose one's own domicile
and profession, and to the right of emigration. The constitutional
duty to work eliminates the possibility of individual and collective
bargaining and the right to strike. The ever increasing control of
the State over economics and education prevents the individual from
enjoying the benefits of the free enterprise system and deprives him
of the right to establish and maintain denominational or other private
educational institutions. In addition, the practice of imposing bans




another serious restriction on the individual freedom of ordinary
citizens.
The Polish Constitution-like the Soviet-includes an extensive
statement of duties: the duty to work,s 5 to abide by the Constitution
and the laws, to maintain the socialist labor discipline, to discharge
the duties towards the State,'l to safeguard and strengthen "social
property" -7 and to defend the country.'; In addition, it is the con-
stitutional duty of every citizen to exhibit "[v]igilance against the
enemies of the nation" and to exert diligence in the "guarding of
State secrets."' ' " Persons who commit sabotage or economic subver-
sion are punished with all the severity of the law.1" ° High treason,
espionage, impairing the armed forces and desertion to the enemy
are described as "the gravest crimes."'
CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of fundamental principles and provisions
governing the new Polish Constitution might be sufficient to convince
us that limited government or constitutionalism, as understood in
Western democratic systems, is non-existent in communist-dominated
Poland. The supreme organs of State authority and State administra-
tion are, in reality and substantially, organs of the Communist Party
from which they are delegated. The policy of the State is the policy
of the Party.
Further, there can be little doubt that the articles concerning pri-
vate property, individual freedom and other fundamental rights un-
successfully attempt to veil the real situation and only contain prop-
agandistic blandishments. The lack of concise expressions and
precise legal terminology in the constitutional document seems to
have been intended to serve as an additional means of providing suf-
ficient leeway for interpretation in order to by-pass vaguely enunci-
ated freedoms whenever political expediency would demand.
The close similarity between the new Polish Constitution and its
Russian model may be taken as an indication of the fact that Poland
today, in the view of the Kremlin, is one of the most sovietized peo-
ple's democracies, a country well 'advanced' toward socialism. Other-
wise she would not have been allowed to borrow so heavily from the
Soviet system, more than some of the other people's democracies do.
On the other hand, a number of significant differences exhibited by the
135. Art. 14, § 1.
136. Art. 76.
137. Art. 77, § 1.
138. Art. 78.
139. Art. 79, § 1.
140. Art. 77, § 2.
141. Art. 79, § 2.
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two Constitutionsj 42 reveal that the framers did not regard Poland as
yet adequately qualified or sufficiently 'advanced' to have earned a full-
fledged Constitution of the Soviet type.
Although the Constitution is flexible enough to provide for easy
amendment,14 3 there is every indication that it will be replaced by a
more 'advanced' document as soon as full-scale socialization and col-
lectivization have been achieved. In the meantime, the political, eco-
nomic and social control under the direction of the Party will become
increasingly tighter with a view to hastening "the full realization of
the Socialist system. 1 44
The long-range constitutional trends and developments in Poland,
as well as in other East European satellite countries, must be viewed
in terms of the entire context of the world power process. So long
as Soviet Russian influence remains a predominant factor in that part
of the globe, the chances for the establishment of a less communisti-
cally inclined r6gime or for a Titoist deviation are hardly existent.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, although there seems
to be a trend toward an eventual constitutional incorporation, this
question will be determined by the Soviet Union according to the
internal and international political exigencies at the time when Poland
will have reached, in her political, economic and social 'advancement,'
a stage essentially identical with that of the Soviet Union.
142. E.g., Poland is claimed to be a people's republic and not a socialist re-
public; it is a State where the full socialization of the means of production has
not yet been accomplished; it is a State where the Communist Party is still an
extra-constitutional organization.
143. Art. 91.
144. See Art. 14, § 1.
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